Assess The Arguments For The No-self Doctrine. free essay sample

Are Annata And Karma Reconcilable? Essay, Research Paper The Buddhist theory of no-self ( annata ) is possibly one of the most foreign, complex and misunderstood constructs for the westerner to hold on. Essentially the # 8220 ; no ego # 8221 ; refers to the denial of a psyche. In this sense the psyche is # 8220 ; the abiding, separate, invariably bing and indestructible entity which is by and large believed to be found in adult male # 8230 ; it is the mind of all his ideas, the actor of all his workss and the manager of the being by and large # 8221 ; ( Malalasckera 1957 ) . Buddhists assert that you can merely be happy once you have discarded the position of a ego ; a self-contradictory state of affairs that seems absurd. The Buddhists see the thought of # 8220 ; I # 8221 ; as a figment of the imaginativeness with nil existent to match to it. If I conjure up another figment of imaginativeness like the thought of # 8220 ; belonging # 8221 ; the # 8220 ; I # 8221 ; concludes that some part of the universe belongs to me. The philosophy of annata assumes two basic propositions ; that nil in world corresponds to words like # 8220 ; I # 8221 ; or # 8220 ; mine # 8221 ; , as there is no fact in ego and that nil in our empirical ego is worthy of being regarded as the existent ego. `There are three basic ways of sing the ego. These are best summarised by a prima figure in Reformed Buddhism, Nyanatiloka, who says: # 8220 ; there are three instructors in the universe. The first instructor teaches the being of an ageless ego-entity outstanding decease: that of the eternalist, as for illustration the Christian. The 2nd instructor teaches a impermanent ego-entity which becomes annihilated at decease: that is the annihilationist, or materialist. The 3rd instructor teaches neither an ageless nor a impermanent ego-entity: that is the Buddha. Annata is an indispensable point of Buddhist doctrine, and is interestingly alone to about all other beliefs and doctrines in the universe today ( with the possible excl usion of David Hume, some 2000 old ages subsequently ) . The importance of annata to Buddhists and it # 8217 ; s deductions for all human actions, moralss and ethical motives is reeling. Rahula, a Sinhala monastic, believes that a position of a lasting self/soul is # 8220 ; the beginning of all the problems in the universe # 8230 ; in short, to this false position can be traced all the immorality in the universe # 8221 ; ( Rahula 1967 ) . In this essay I hope to carry through a figure of things. First to supply the statements for the no-self theory and explicate how Buddhists construct personality. Second, I intend to look at the statements rebuting annata, particularly Descartes # 8220 ; I think hence I am # 8221 ; . Third, I hope to pull some analogues to Buddhism with Western doctrine and eventually reason the essay. `An of import portion of understanding how Buddha came to disregard the construct of ego is to see how he constructed the personality of the person. Buddhist # 8217 ; s sketch five factors ( Khanda # 8217 ; s ) which relate to a province of grasping and fond regard that identifies with # 8220 ; I # 8221 ; or # 8220 ; myself # 8221 ; . The first is rupa, material form, which takes its signifier in the outer universe or in the life organic structure. It is composed of Earth, air current, fire and H2O that are the constituents from which are castanetss, flesh and tissue are created etc. The other khanda # 8217 ; s are all mental in nature. The 2nd factor, vedanna, is # 8220 ; experiencing # 8221 ; ; the pleasant, unpleasant or apathetic # 8220 ; gustatory sensation # 8221 ; of an experience. The 3rd khanda is sanna, or knowledge, which allows us to label things # 8220 ; adult male # 8221 ; # 8220 ; blue # 8221 ; # 8220 ; tomato # 8221 ; etc It informs us of what we are witting of. Sankhara ( building activity ) refers to mental provinces that initiate action ; like attending, choler and most significantly # 8220 ; will # 8 221 ; . The concluding khanda, vinnana, is discriminatory consciousness, or outlook ( see subsequently ) . Via speculation and virtuousness, it is possible to exceed the reading of # 8220 ; self # 8221 ; which the khanda # 8217 ; s supply and make Nibbana ( a lasting province of cloud nine ) . `What so are the statements which support annata? In Brahmanical idea, the ego could achieve cosmopolitan power through attained cognition. Buddha denied the being of such a ego by claiming we had no such control over it. In the # 8220 ; discourse on the features of not-self # 8221 ; ( Anattalakkhana Sutta ) the Buddha uses the illustration of a organic structure, the first khanda rupa, to turn out his point: ` # 8221 ; organic structure, monastics, is not-self. Were it self, the organic structure would non endure affliction, and one could hold of organic structure `let my organic structure be this, allow my organic structure be that` # 8221 ; . Due to the of course altering behavior of our organic structures, for which we have no control, the ill-conceived constructs of # 8220 ; I am organic structure # 8221 ; or # 8220 ; organic structure is mine # 8221 ; is clearly false and causes heartache, enduring and anxiousness. The Buddha is evidently mentioning to malformations, disease, old age and necessarily decease every bit good as more fiddling things such as attraction, hair coloring material etc. The five khanda # 8217 ; s are not-self because we have no voluntary control or way over them. `Buddha extends his statement by proposing what is temporary, unsatisfactory and capable to alter could non perchance be regarded as ego. In the undermentioned discourse with another monastic, he argues ; ` # 8221 ; Is what is temporary satisfactory or unsatisfactory? # 8221 ; ` # 8221 ; unsatisfactory, sir. # 8221 ; `Is it suiting to see what is temporary, unsatisfactory and capable to alter as `this is mine, this I am this is my self` ? # 8221 ; ` # 8221 ; No sir # 8221 ; . ( Anattalakkana Sutta ) `The statement which Buddha is basically seting forward is anything which comes into being from an unsatisfactory, random and impermanent beginning could non logically or perchance take on to the creative activity of something governable, lasting and satisfied. `Another statement for annata concerns the ways in which you can see the construct of ego. A monastic, Ananda, was badly criticised by Buddha for believing there were three possible ways of carry throughing this undertaking. They were experiencing s regarded every bit indistinguishable to self ( feeling is self ) , self without experiencing ( the ego is insensate ) or neither except # 8220 ; my ego has the property of experiencing # 8221 ; . Buddha believed this position was incorrect on a figure of histories. To get down with feelings were of three types ( vedana ) ; pleasant, painful and impersonal. Because these feelings are temporary so the ego would hold to be excessively, and becaus e it is assumed that the ego is of a lasting nature, so clearly self can non be experiencing. Buddha # 8217 ; s counter to the statement that the ego is insensate is merely to state that it would be impossible to state # 8220 ; I am # 8221 ; where there is no feeling at all. In response to the statement that the ego is able to experience, or have the capacity to experience, he answers: # 8220 ; whe re feeling is completely absent†¦might one be able to say `this is what I am?`†. As this is not possible the idea is dismissed. `Paticca-samuppada, the continuity of experience as explained by the â€Å"dependent Origination† is another argument which supports the no-self hypothesis. For Buddhists, the agent behind experience (such as consciousness) is replaced by impersonal conditioned elements. Consciousness is defined â€Å"according to the condition through which it arises†. This is compared to the analogy that a fire is named after the fuel that feeds it ; â€Å"grass fire†, â€Å"oil-fire†, â€Å"forest-fire† etc. These elements form a twelve fold sequence which embodies the succession of events and lives in the â€Å"round of rebirth†, without the concept of reincarnating the individual. Consciousness is not a permanent, unchanging self, but rather a condition created by it’s environment. `One of the most famous arg uments against the no-self theory is Descartes â€Å"Cogito ergo sum† (I think therefore I am). The reasoning behind this relatively simple statement seemed undeniable proof of the existence of â€Å"self†. Even if you think of not existing or not thinking, you are still aware of yourself, an â€Å"I†, doing the task. For Descartes, this was the first undeniable fact from which he could discover the truth. The argument is perhaps more clearly demonstrated by the story of a student who reads too much metaphysics. He becomes unsettled when he discovers that he has no proof of his existence and in desperation asks his lecturer â€Å"do I exist?†, to which the lecturer replies â€Å"who’s asking the question†. Although the answer presumably satisfies the student, the argument which Descartes put forth is actually flawed. His original argument is confused by the grammatical terminology of the word â€Å"I†. There is no need for the â€Å" I† in â€Å"I think† to refer to anything. According to Buddhism, Descartes was merely aware of thinking, not that â€Å"I† was doing the thinking. He could have, and perhaps should have said â€Å"there is thinking therefore there are thoughts†. Without the â€Å"I† there is no evidence of a self involved. The common reply to this counter argument is that the term â€Å"think† requires â€Å"I† as a subject to the verb. However, this is also flawed as it is only a grammatical convention and the word â€Å"it† could be replaced with â€Å"I† which again would not imply a subject/self. `Another argument which places some scepticism on the theory of annata is a claim that the no-self theory is merely another ontological phenomena created for the sole purpose of undermining Brahmanism and Jainism whilst simultaneously acting as a component of faith akin to Western religions. Buddha’s spiritual quest can be seen as a s earch to identify and liberate a person’s true self : atman. Such an entity was thought to be a persons inner nature, a permanent source of true happiness. In Brahmanism, atman was seen as the universal self identical with Brahman, whilst in Jainism it was seen as Jiva, the individual life principle. However, as I have already described earlier, the Buddha has clearly laid forward many argument to dismiss the permanent nature of the self. If you consider religion to be a man made creation which fills a social function then you can understand Buddha’s reasons for denying the self. If he thought he had discovered a way of living which reduced the suffering he observed around him, then he would need to undermine people’s faith in the two leading religions of his time (Brahmanism and Jainism) in order to convert them. The theory of no-self fits this role perfectly for it attacks the core assumptions of these religions (and unbeknownst to Buddha, most western religio ns as well) whilst providing a goal (Nibbana) which is just as impossible to prove or falsify as heaven or hell. `Some critics have also attacked the no-self doctrine on a supposed contradiction between karma and annata. Buddhist karmic theory states that people undergo more than one life, sometimes maintaining memories and behaviours after death. This would seem to suggest some permanent self within us which transcends death but annata clearly refutes such a claim. It would seem logical then to conclude that one of these concepts must be wrong, yet this is not the case, for once again it is a matter of interpretation. One way of looking at this argument is the difference between speaking convention and philosophical truth. Reference to death is a convenient and useful expression yet it does not imply a permanent self. The reason for this, is simply that our view of death as a final end is incorrect. To the Buddhists, death is merely another experience in a chain of events which con tinues endlessly. In a conventional way a person deaths, but the philosophical view says that no permanent self survives, only a series of mental and physical events. ` David Hume, a western philosopher, came to a similar view of the self as Buddhism. He found no evidence for the existence of a permanent self. However, Hume believed the mind was a series of discrete momentary â€Å"awareness† or â€Å"impressions† which followed one another rapidly in succession, very much like a link on a chain. This analogy raises an important distinction between the Buddhist conception of mind and Humes conception of mind, for the Buddhist’s view consciousness as a constant flow of thought. In this respect, the Buddhist theory is more like William James’s (1850) view of the mind who saw mental activity as a â€Å"stream of thought†. `Even though the arguments for annata convincingly deny the existence of a self, I can still not believe that they are correct. The argument against Descartes’ â€Å"I think† argument still lacks something. It is not adequate to say that the word â€Å"I† is not needed in the term â€Å"I think† for the word â€Å"I† was created to describe an inner feeling of self and was not created as a convenient means of belonging. I think the Buddha was trying to identify and cure people’s dissatisfaction by eliminating the ego. I would interpret his denial of the self as a denial of those negative feelings associated with possessiveness, greed, bitterness, vanity and arrogance. ` `BIBLIOGRAPHY: `Harvey Peter (1990) An introduction to Buddhism Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. `Collins, S ( ) Selfless Persons. `Giles, J â€Å"The no self theory : Hume, Buddhism and Personal identity. In Philosophy East and west. `Jewell, Nik (1995) Buddhist Philosophy Seminar Notes.